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Article 17

CONTROL MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
PROF. W. MICHAEL REISMAN*
My professor on the Law of Personal Status began one of his invariably
dry lectures with the words "[miatrimony is an institution that concludes
in death or divorce." It struck me then as a terribly unromantic way
of looking at something wonderful. For all I know, the professor may
have been as romantic as I was. His point was that lawyers, as designers
of social relationships, must look beyond the moment of exhilarating
consensus when those relationships are created to that inevitable momentusually quite rancorous-when, in one way or another, they are undergoing
stress or are ending. Domestic law provides compulsory institutions for
resolving conflicts about commitments and relationships. To a large extent,
international law does not. Whether an international transaction comprises
a single event or a large number of events linked in complex and continuing
legal and economic relationships, the responsible attorney must plan for
the resolution of disputes.
Inevitably, most of the efforts of negotiators are going to be directed
toward shaping the substantive transaction. By the time agreement is
reached, negotiators are often exhausted and, as the champagne is uncorked, they may pay relatively little attention to dispute resolution. More
often than not, negotiators will simply jam an off-the-shelf dispute resolution clause into the miscellaneous chapter at the end of the agreement.
One indication of how automatic this has sometimes been is some arbitration clauses in important post-war contracts still referred to the

Permanent Court of International Justice as the back-up appointment
authority, despite the fact that the Permanent Court had long since ceased
to exist.
In the last two decades, however, practitioners and scholars have come
to give considerably more attention to the anticipatory design of dispute
resolution mechanisms in international transactions. A wide range of
model clauses has been developed for incorporation into different types
of contracts. Supervisory authorities may be selected from many different
national and supra-national institutions.
Unfortunately, one dimension of the design of transnational dispute
resolution procedures still receives insufficient attention: controls.' Controls are techniques or mechanisms in engineered artifacts, whether phys* Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. LL.B. and LL.M., Hebrew University;
J.S.D., Yale Law School. Andrew Willard read a draft of this paper and made many useful
suggestions. The author acknowledges with gratitude the research assistance of Patricia L. Small,
Yale Law School, J.D. 1995.
1. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION (1992).
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ical or social, whose function is to ensure that an artifact works as it
was designed to work.
In social and legal arrangements in which a limited power is delegated,
control systems are essential. Without them, the limited power may become
absolute.
In domestic law, a sequence of appeal options within a national judicial
bureaucracy provides control over judicial decision. Comparable layers
of contingent controls are not available internationally, for there is no
international hierarchical judicial bureaucracy. International dispute resolution procedures were traditionally single-instance affairs; facts and law
were decided together in the first and only instance of decision. In smaller
groups, even single-instance procedures can be controlled by informal
peer controls. They may function as controls in some national settings,
but are unlikely to operate in transnational settings where so many actors
and so many different cultural values converge in one transaction. And
this is unsatisfactory not only because human beings may err, but because
granting people authority to act within certain normative guidelines, but
not providing controls to enforce those guidelines, greatly increases the
"moral hazards" of any enterprise.
In designing controls for international dispute resolution procedures,
the alternatives to appeal are limited.
Historically, in the absence of a hierarchical institutional control, the
doctrine of excs de pouvoir was supposed to function as a control.
Exc&s de pouvoir was premised on the notion that the mechanisms parties
created to resolve disputes only had the competence that the parties had
assigned to them. If the mechanism-an international tribunal, for example-exceeded its power in a particular instance, the decision that
resulted was null and void and could be disregarded. The injured party
could invoke excs de pouvoir unilaterally as a justification for refusing
to comply with the decision.
The doctrine of excbs de pouvoir was elegant in theory but awkward
in practice. Its operation presupposes clear criteria by which to appraise
the procedures of an arbitration, no small amount of good faith in human
nature, which is always perilous, and a substantial capacity for selfdelusion. Not surprisingly, the doctrine of exc&s de pouvoir proved highly
susceptible to abuse. This audience will surely remember the long and
rancorous history of the United States repudiation of the Chamizal
Award. 2
In the inter-war period, when there was a burst of international arbitration to clear away the debris of the war, the League of Nations
considered empowering the Permanent Court of International Justice to
hear claims of excs de pouvoir.a The proposal languished and died. It

2. In re International Title to the Chamizal Tract (United States and Mexico) (Int'l Boundary
Comm'n, June 15, 1911), reprinted in 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1911).
3. The proposal was initially made by the government of Finland during the tenth session of
the League of Nations Assembly in September 1929. The Assembly considered a report and draft
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was rejected then, and again when Professor Georges Scelle tried to
adapt it for the draft Convention on International Arbitration of the
International Law Commission. 4 Some commercial arbitration systems,
such as the International Chamber of Commerce, provide for a limited
internal review of awards prior to their certification, but the grounds
are largely technical.
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards' developed a different control mechanism
for awards arising from disputes between private parties. The Convention
uses the network of national courts in all of the States likely to be parties
to an international convention. 6 Generally, international dispute resolution
mechanisms avoid national courts so as not to require either of the
disputants to litigate on the other's turf. That is often the predicate of
their selection of a more neutral, transnational modality. The New York
Convention contained that potential danger by incorporating national
court systems but severely limiting the grounds on which national courts
seized of a case may review an award.
The control mechanism of the 1958 Convention has proved to be a
remarkably efficient device for the specific types of arbitration for which
it was designed. It is workable but rather less appropriate for cases in
which one of the parties is a government and especially for cases involving
matters of great importance to the political economy of one or both of
the parties. Such was the situation facing the World Bank when it decided
to develop a control mechanism for the special arbitral institution it was
establishing for investment disputes. The bank, committed to accelerating
development in the chronically poorer states by the introduction of capital
that would otherwise be unavailable, yet appreciating the limited amount
of public capital available for the purpose, sought to encourage the flow
of private capital into direct foreign investment in developing countries.
But this was a period of new state nationalism with new claims of
rights of expropriation and national jurisdiction as a means of economic
resolution in September 1931, but postponed its decision on the matter and apparently abandoned
the proposal thereafter. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Council to Study the Proposal
of the Government of Finland to Confer on the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice Jurisdiction
as a Tribunal of Appeal in Respect of Arbitral Tribunals Established by States, V LEAGUE OF
NATIONS PUBLICATIONS (Legal), 1930 V.12 (1930); see also 1928-1929 LEAGUE FROM YEAR TO YEAR
68-69; 9 MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 307 (1929); 1930-1931 LEAGUE FROM YEAR
TO YEAR 47-48; 11 MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 262, 265-66 (1931).
4. Arbitral Procedure-Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure Adopted by the Commission at
its Fifth Session: Report by Georges Scelle, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/109 (1957),
reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add. 1.
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Conventioni.
6. Article 11(3) of the New York Convention provides:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless
it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
Id. art. 11(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
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self-determination. These trends hardly encouraged risk-averse private
investment. The World Bank identified a number of obstacles that might
be minimized by an appropriately structured dispute resolution mechanism.
The bank created the International Convention on the Settlement of
International Disputes (ICSID). 7 Under ICSID, as it has come to be
known, capital exporting states agreed not to exercise "diplomatic protection," 8 a euphemism for what are often rather coercive actions on
behalf of nationals whose property has been taken. Developing countries
committed themselves to proceeding directly to arbitration. Unless specifically indicated, they were presumed to have waived the requirement
of exhaustion of domestic remedies. 9
Designing a control mechanism for this particular form of dispute
resolution was challenging. The control mechanism of the New York
Convention, which has proven so successful, would not have suited this
type of arbitration, for governments would have been loathe to submit
to foreign courts, even for control purposes. Likewise foreign investors,
who were understandably reluctant to have their disputes heard by the
courts of the host state, pressed for a different approach.
The designers of the ICSID Convention were inspired by the efforts
of Professor Georges Scelle two decades earlier. But instead of incorporating the International Court as their control mechanism, as Scelle
had wished, they created, in its stead, an internal control mechanism.
Briefly, the ICSID Convention allows every state party to nominate a
number of potential arbitrators to an ICSID list.1o When a dispute arises,
the parties may, but need not, select their arbitrators from this list."
When an award is rendered and one or more of the parties believes that
the tribunal was improperly constituted; manifestly exceeded its powers;
departed from a fundamental rule of procedure; failed to justify the
award; or that one of the tribunal members was corrupted, the aggrieved
party may lodge an application for annulment within 120 days.' 2 Once
the application is filed, the chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council
appoints an ad hoc committee of three persons from that list of names
that had been proposed by the state members. But no member of the
ad hoc committee may be a national of the state 3party or of the country
of the foreign investor involved in the dispute.
Though its mandate is more circumscribed than the tribunal whose
award it is reviewing, the ad hoc committee is, in effect, another tribunal
following substantially the same procedures outlined in the Convention
for the original tribunal. The committee may stay enforcement of the

7. Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States,
March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1271, 575 U.N.T.S. 160 (hereinafter ICSID Convention]. For background
material, see REISMAN, supra note 1,at 46-50.
8. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 27, 17 U.S.T. at 1281, 575 U.N.T.S. at 176.
9. Id. art. 26.
10. Id. art. 13, 17 U.S.T. at 1276, 575 U.N.T.S. at 168.
11. Id. art. 40, 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 184.
12. Id. art. 52(i), 17 U.S.T. at 1290, 575 U.N.T.S. at 192.
13. Id. art. 52(3).
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award during its proceedings. 14 If it finds that there has been a violation
of one or more of the standards, the ad hoc committee is also authorized
to annul the award in whole or in part. If the award is nullified by the
committee, either party may submit the dispute to a new tribunal, constituted in accordance with the Convention."5
The advantage of this control mechanism was that it provided a review
of an international award, challenged by one party as violating the
procedural conventions of international arbitration, while avoiding many
of the well-known perils, it contained the potential for abuse in the
institution of the unilateral claim of excs de pouvoir. It also avoided
shifting the dispute to a national court, which would have been unacceptable, given the nature of the economic relationships that were involved.
Nor did the control mechanism place the dispute before the International
Court. That would have been structurally difficult given the fact that
one of the parties was not a state. And using the court as the control
mechanism would certainly have been politically unacceptable. An award
could be challenged, but unlike the classic claim of excs de pouvoir,
notoriously susceptible to abuse, a claim under ICSID was channeled
within the bank arbitration process, in a procedure to which the parties
had already agreed.
The ICSID review procedure was not used for the first 17 years of
the institution. Finally, in 1983, the procedure got off to a rather rocky
start. In Kiockner v. Cameroon,16 the ad hoc committee took a very
technical approach. It expanded the grounds for annulment by permitting
a claimant to allege any violation of the Convention in the review
procedure. 7 In addition, it created a hair-trigger mechanism for annulment, without regard to the materiality or gravity of a violation." The
net result, as many scholars at the time observed, was to pressure counsel
representing losing parties to challenge the award and, insofar as review
became a regular feature, to transform ICSID into a two-level arbitration.
Happily, in a number of subsequent decisions by ad hoc committees,
the excessiveness of Kl6ckner was tempered. 19 The control mechanism
appears to have been repaired and the ICSID experiment seems back on
track.
To their credit, the designers of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
between the United States and Canada carefully considered the control
mechanism problem when they shaped the dispute resolution procedure.
I have some reservations about the wisdom of the essential design of
the first-instance binational panel, 20 and I will comment on it in a moment.

14. Id. art. 52(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 192.
15. Id. art. 52(6).
16. Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee (May 3, 1985), reprinted in I
ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 89 (1986).
17. Id. paras. 58-59.
18. Id. para. 179.
19. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, Decision of the Ad
Hoc Committee (Dec. 22, 1989), reprinted in 5 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Investment L.J. 95 (1990).
20. See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, arts. 1901 & 1904, annex 1901.2.
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But I greatly admire the FTA's design for a control mechanism in the
second instance.
The FTA control challenge was strikingly similar to that facing the
designers of ICSID. The first-instance decision mechanism, largely based
on the contemporary private arbitration model, plainly required a control
mechanism to police moral hazard and to resolve disputes about the
propriety of first instance decisions by the bi-national panels. But designing
a mechanism for disputes with incredibly high stakes for two collaborating
but competitive political economies was no easy task. Prior to the FTA,
the control had consisted of resorting to a higher level in the judicial
bureaucracies of the states concerned. But to assign control to the court
systems of one of the parties would have frustrated the purpose of
"denationalizing" the first instance. Hence, the FTA created an "extraordinary challenge" procedure, which permits the United States or
Canadian government to seek review of a panel determination in a
narrowly defined set of circumstances. Under Article 1904, section 13,
a party must allege that a panel member violated the rules of conduct, 21
that "the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, ' 22 or that the panel exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction.23
In addition, the party must demonstrate that the alleged action "materially
affected the panel's decision" 24 and that the action "threatens the integrity
of the binational review process." 25 Once a party invokes the extraordinary
challenge procedure, a committee of three judges, rather than ad hoc
arbitrators, reviews the original decision and within thirty days renders
a decision to affirm, vacate, or remand.
The procedure has been invoked only twice thus far, on both occasions
by the United States. The jurisprudence that has emerged under these
provisions is quite interesting. The first dispute involved the importation
of subsidized pork from Canada.16 The United States challenged a binational panel ruling that limited the evidence the International Trade
Commission (ITC) could consider. The panel's decision, in essence, forced
the ITC to reverse its earlier determination that Canada's subsidies threatened a United States industry with material injury. 27 Two of three commissioners charged that the panel's ruling .'violate[d] fundamental
principles' of the FTA and 'contain[ed] egregious errors under U.S.

law.' "'28
21. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, art. 1904.13(a)(i).
22. Id. art. 1904.13(a)(ii).
23. Id. art. 1904.13(a)(iii).
24. Id. art. 1904.13(b).
25. Id.
26. In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. ECC-91-1904-01USA, 1991
FTAPD LEXIS 7.
27. The challenged ruling was the second of two panel decisions in the dispute to remand the
determination to the ITC. The Panel first remanded the determination because the ITC's findings
had been based on erroneous statistics. After the first remand, the ITC reopened the record to

gather new information on certain narrow aspects of its investigation. After the ITC issued its
second determination, the Panel found that the ITC had erred in considering information outside
those narrow aspects, and remanded the determination again.
28. Id.at *6.
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The Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) dismissed the challenge
request, finding that the United States had failed to demonstrate that
the alleged errors constituted departures from rules of procedure or
constituted abuses of power, authority, or jurisdiction. In addition, the
ECC determined that none of the alleged errors materially affected that
panel's decision or threatened the integrity of the binational panel review
process. 29 The committee noted that its role was an extremely narrow
one: the ECC was not to act as a routine appeal mechanism, but to
respond to "aberrant panel decisions." 0
The second ECC case was more controversial. The United States requested review of a decision concerning live swine, in which a binational
panel had determined that certain Canadian subsidies were not "specific"
and therefore not countervailable. The United States alleged that the
panel had exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its judgment for that
of the Commerce Department. 3 Although the ECC unanimously dismissed
the challenge, the committee found several aspects of the panel's review
disturbing. The committee acknowledged that it felt "the Panel may have
erred" in overturning the Commerce Department's determination, but
the committee "was not persuaded that the Panel manifestly exceeded
the appropriate standard of review." 3 2 The committee also criticized the
panel's refusal to permit the Commerce Department to reopen the record
in the proceeding."
Throughout the opinion, the ECC emphasized the extremely narrow
scope of its review: "The ECC should address systemic problems and
not mere legal issues that do not threaten the integrity of the FTA's
dispute resolution mechanism itself." 3 4 The committee envisioned a narrow
role for the binational panels as well:
Panels must follow and apply the law, not create it . . . they are not
appellate courts ....
Panels may not articulate the prevailing law

and then depart from it in a clandestine attempt to change the law.3

Restraint is obviously a critical feature of control mechanisms. Too
little restraint transforms control into appeal. But too much restraint
undermines the deterrent effect of a control system. It is, of course, too
early to appraise the aggregate performance of the FTA control system,
but as a student of these mechanisms, my sense-and it is tentative-is
that the ECCs have shaped a role for themselves that may generate
insufficient expectations of control in binational panels. The fact that,
to date, no Extraordinary Challenge Committee has annulled a decision
by a binational panel may, of course, testify to the high quality of the

29.
30.
31.
LEXIS
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at *15-*16.
Id. at *9.
In the matter of: Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. ECC-93-1904-01USA, 1993 FTAPD
I, at *10.
Id. at *14-*15.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *15-*16.
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binational panels. But one of the consequences of a string of confirmations
is the absence of guidelines of control. Uncertainty here may, in subtle
ways, undermine the latent restraints of a control mechanism.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) sets forth the
same three-pronged test for launching an extraordinary challenge.3 6 The
only substantive difference between the NAFTA and the FTA provisions
is that NAFTA makes explicit what was arguably implicit in the FTA:
that by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review, a panel
3
exceeds its authority.
There are a number of important differences between the approach of
ICSID and the approach of the free trade agreements to control mechanisms. First, under the free trade agreements, a party seeking an
extraordinary challenge must show that the alleged action (i) materially
affected the panel's decision and (ii) threatened the integrity of the panel
system. ICSID did not prescribe a test of materiality, a lacuna into which
the Kiockner ad hoc committee tumbled. Nor did ICSID prescribe the
requirement that the implications for the systemic dimension be taken
into account. Neither of these two requirements were fully explored in
the FTA's ECC cases, because in neither case did the petitioner meet
the threshold requirement of showing an abuse of power or a departure
from rules of procedure. As a result, the full scope of ECC review and
control is not known and may be under-appreciated.
Another distinction is that only parties to the free trade agreements,
not private litigants, can seek ECC review. This is an important distinction
that may be justified by the major political and economic implications
of the dispute resolution mechanism itself. Yet, it inevitably has implications for the private parties' expectations of justice. The fact that the
right of initiation of the control mechanism is restricted to the governments
could mean that the ECC will function as a more restrained control
mechanism than an ad hoc ICSID committee. It could also mean that
when ECC cases are brought, they will be more politicized, with potentially
greater stakes for the continuity of the FTA itself.
The FTA and NAFTA represent innovative responses to the problem
of control in international dispute resolution. They take an existing model
and adapt it wisely. The question now is whether the ICSID model is
optimally appropriate as a dispute resolution mechanism for FTA and
NAFTA type regimes.
I believe that it would be useful to consider a range of new types of
institutions. I am persuaded by Professor David Caron's insightful observations in this regard. Caron notes the incongruity of adapting the
private arbitration model for the resolution of disputes that have major
public consequences. Perhaps it is time to fashion a new type of institution:
a permanent, binational tribunal on the order of the United States-Iranian
Claims Tribunal. The creation of a permanent bi-national or tri-national
36. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1904, § 13,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-59 (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
37. Id. art. 1904(13)(a)(iii).
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judiciary, developing a consistent jurisprudence, might be an exorbitant
cost if only a few cases were contemplated. But, if a complex free trade
regime between two or three great political economies is anticipated, the
number of disputes would amply justify a more permanent arrangement.
Such an arrangement would also reduce the temporal and financial transaction costs involved in assembling a panel in case after case. A more
permanent arrangement, in turn, would provide a degree of consistency
to decisions and permit the development of an esprit de corps among
the judges.
For the present, governments could take a series of steps to create
more homogeneity in the work of the panels. Workshops and seminars
for those who have been nominated by their governments to be on the
list could familiarize panelists with each other and with the jurisprudence
and the problems that recur in this form of dispute resolution.
The lessons of the last twenty years in the construction of international
dispute resolution mechanisms are clear. There is no single model available,
though every model must have a control mechanism. Drawing on the
wisdom and experience of the past, each new mechanism must be tailored
to the special needs of the process in which it is incorporated. International
lawyers, especially from the private Bar, have a unique opportunity to
play an important and innovative constitutive role in this area. It is a
great challenge, but it is also a great opportunity and great fun.

